


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
### BRIEFING SEQUENCE

- FRAME OF REFERENCE  
MANNING FUNCTIONS
- MANNING PROCESS TODAY
- A NEW CONCEPT
  - COHESION
  - UNIT REPLACEMENT OPTIONS
  - RECOMMENDATIONS

## MISSION

## TIO STUDY TEAM

- CONDUCT A COORDINATED, DETAILED REVIEW OF THE ARMY'S PERSONNEL SYSTEM.
- DETERMINE WHETHER THE ARMY SHOULD:
  - RETAIN THE INDIVIDUAL REPLACEMENT PROCESS
  - ADOPT A FORM OF UNIT REPLACEMENT
  - CONVERT TO A COMBINATION UNIT - INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT OR ROTATION SYSTEM
- DEVELOP A PERSONNEL SYSTEM CONCEPT THAT WILL IMPROVE THE PRESENT PROCESS AND PROVIDE A FLEXIBLE MANAGEMENT SCHEME WHICH CAN BE INTEGRATED INTO THE FORCE STRUCTURE



CONDITIONS

Examine Comba: Compan


Expand to Ba talions Combat Support and Comba Servic Support Un

Focus Mobilization and Reserve component

Forc in rd ep oyed

Volun and yea

Consider RDJTF and ing,



APPROACH

- CSM tasking
- White Paper Content for the 1980's

Force Structure

Manning the total force

Management of modernization

- <sup>AIN</sup>~~Training~~ the force
- Mobilizing the force

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# DEFINITIONS

**MANNING SYSTEM:** A CLEARLY DEFINED AND DISCIPLINED METHODOLOGY WHICH INTEGRATES THE NECESSARY POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND MANAGEMENT TOOLS REQUIRED TO ACTIVELY DEFINE THE FORCE AND TO CONTINUOUSLY MAN IT WITH QUALIFIED SOLDIERS AS INDIVIDUALS OR UNITS.


**FORCE STRUCTURE SUBSYSTEM:** DESIGNING THE FORCE WITHIN LEGISLATED END STRENGTH.


**MANPOWER SUBSYSTEM:** ALLOCATION AND DOCUMENTATION OF THE FORCE.

**PERSONNEL SUBSYSTEM:** DISTRIBUTING AND SUSTAINING THE FORCE.

**REPLACEMENT:** INTRODUCING NEW INDIVIDUALS OR UNITS INTO THE FORCE.

**ROTATION:** MOVING INDIVIDUALS OR UNITS WITHIN THE FORCE.





THE EFFORT

16 Officers, 1 SGM

10 Commands/Activities Represented

USAWC - 5

Controller of the Army - 1

USAREC - 1

- MILPERCEN - 3

TRADOC - 3

- FORSCOM - 1

- CAC - 1

- DCSPER - 1

- RCPAC - 1

- CHIEF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 1 (CNAUNON)

- 7 Battalion Commanders

- 6 ORSA Specialists

- 8 Personnel Management Specialists

- 2 ADP Specialists

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INDIVIDUAL GROUP

ACSA	DCSPER	US AIR FORCE
AFMCO	GRC	USAFORSCOM
ASA (MARA)	MILPERCEN	USAREC
CAA	NGB	USASSC
CH, MILITARY HISTORY	OCAR	USATRADO
COA	RCFAC	
DCSLOG		
DCSOPS		

*AP Feary*

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ENGINEERS (OCE)

OCAR

NCB

MILPERCEN

MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE

FORCE MODERNIZATION OFFICE

DELTA FORCE

DCSPER

DCSOPS

DCSLOG

CH, MILITARY HISTORY

WHO WE CONTACTED FOR INFORMATION:

UNIT GROUP

*Re Facing*

ANALYSIS GROUP

WHO WE CONTACTED FOR INFORMATION:

ACSAC

ARI

CAV

DCSOPS

DCSPER

MILPERGEN

USAMSA

USAREC

RB  
Rabin


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
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# STUDY TEAM


## ARMY GOALS

- A FULLY MANNED AND QUALIFIED FORCE.
- COHESION AND STABILITY IN UNITS.
- A MANNING SYSTEM TO ENHANCE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.
- INCREASED READINESS AND IMPROVED TRAINING.
- INTEGRATED INTRODUCTION OF NEW EQUIPMENT.





# INVESTIGATION



HISTORICAL ANALYSIS  
COST ANALYSIS

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
Echelons DETERMINATION


REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS  
FORCE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS

MODELLED INTERACTIONS  
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS


PERTURBATION / OSCILLATION ANALYSIS

## INVESTIGATION

- Current policies studied
  - Review existing and ongoing studies
- Develop and highlight important systemic issues
- Model the Army Personnel System
- Identify the costs of a unit replacement system
- Develop observations on issues of lesser significance



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# FORCE STRUCTURE / MANPOWER MANAGEMENT

## FUNCTIONS

- UNITS NEEDED
- END STRENGTH
- FORCE STRUCTURE ALLOW.
- SPACE ALLOWANCE

## AGENCIES (28)

- HQDA & MACOMS
- DCSOPS DRIVES
- DCSPER INVOLVED

## MGMT INFO SYSTEMS (23)

- AFP/PBS/CBS
- FAS
- TAADS
- PERSACS
- ELIMCOMPLIP

## CHARACTERISTICS

FACES NOT EQUAL TO SPACES  
BY NUMBERS-GRADE/SKILLS  
CONTINUOUS CHANGES IN TDAS &  
NON-STANDARD MTOE'S  
DECENTRALIZED DOCUMENTATION  
AND APPROVAL AUTHORITY  
RESULTS IN INFEASIBLE  
GRADE/MOS STRUCTURE  
MANY DOCUMENTS NOT CURRENT  
CURRENT MIS INADEQUATE TO  
DEAL WITH MAGNITUDE OF  
CHANGES IN DETAIL AND  
LANGUAGE REQUIRED

## OBSERVATIONS

- FORCE NOT MANNED AT 100% OF AUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE/SKILL
- MANY DECISION MAKERS CONSTANTLY INFLUENCE PROCESS
  - PROponents APPROVE THE MAJORITY OF DOCUMENT CHANGES
- CONTINUOUS INYEAR REDEFINITION OF FORCE CAUSES TURBULENCE
  - 2 MOC WINDOW CHANGES = 1.67 MIL PER YEAR
- CURRENT MIS DO NOT ACCURATELY DEFINE FORCE
  - PBG DECISIONS NOT REQUIRED TO BE DOCUMENTED IN TIMELY MANNER
- GRADE AUTHORIZATIONS EXCEED LEGISLATED LIMITS
  - AUTHORIZED 14,7k E8;
  - LEGISLATED 13.3k

These observations are still VALID.

2. Continuous changes in TDAS and non-standard MTOE's.
3. Decentralized documentation and approval authority results in infeasible grade/MOS structure.
  - o 70<sup>+</sup> MOS cannot be sustained.
4. Many documents not current.
  - o 2681 units had non-current documents as of 17 Mar 81.
  - o Continuous Changes in documents (Feb 80).
    - 4227 Documents define Active Army for a structure.
    - 7418 Units (MTOE & TDA).
    - 16,652 Documents received at HQDA Oct 79 - Sep 80.
    - 1.67 Million separate TAADS transactions 5 Jan - 5 Apr 80.
5. Civilian E.S. reductions causes BMM.
  - 56K Civ E.S. reduction 74/79, appr 30K BMM.
6. Current MIS inadequate to deal with magnitude of changes in detail and language required.
  - o Inadequate MIS.
    - Appropriations (MPA/CPA).
    - Program Elements (OSD).
    - FYDP by PE.
    - FYDP by Def Pgm planning categories (Congress).
    - Army Mgt Structure Codes (functions-lowest level).

**D. OBSERVATIONS**

1. Force not manned at 100% of authorizations by grade/skill.
2. Many decision makers constantly influence process.
  - o Proponents approve the majority of document changes.
  - o Only 20% of proponent proposed changes for personnel are reviewed for impact.
3. Continuous inyear redefinition of Force causes turbulence
  - o 101st reorg - 1400 spaces in current year.
  - o Ft. Hood maneuver Bn - 757 spaces in FY 81; 1027 in FY 82.
  - o 2 MOC window changes = 1.67 mil per year
4. Current MIS do not accurately define Force.
  - o PBC decisions not required to be documented in timely manner.
  - o AFP-PAS at aggregate level. However, all other systems are out of sync.
5. Grade authorizations exceed legislated limits.
  - o Authorizations 14.7K; legislated 13.3K EB.
  - o Std of grades are guidance - not mandatory.

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- o SPECIFOR - Specification for Impr. Force Structuring Models - Converts FAS output into data to MFPS & REVERSE.
- o CONFORM - Constrained Force Model - Optimizes Troop list from MFPS based on scenario constraints (Meters, Equip, \$.)
- o CARDS - Catalog Appr Req Doc System - Records QMR, ROC - Project list and status.
- o CSRS - Combat Spt Ratio System - Assists in determining maintenance units needed in Force.
- o MFPS - Modular Force Planning System-Troop list for theaters.
- o AMSCO - Army Mgt Structure Code - II posn code that describes a specific function.
- o AIDE-E - Automated Interactive Detector Model - Enlisted. Projects enlisted losses, feeds ELIM-COMPLIP.
- o PBS - PGM and Budget Subsystem of FORDIMS
- o FSS - Force Structure Subsystem of FORDIMS

**C. CHARACTERISTICS**

**1. Faces not equal to spaces by numbers - grade/skills.**

	People	Auth	Year End Average
78-	673.8	671.7	(+2.1)
79	659.7	676.8	(-17.1)
80	657.5	674.4	(-16.9)
81	671.6	671.6	0.0
82	670.2	673.1	-2.9
83	673.8	674.5	-0.6
84	680.0	682.2	-2.2
85	679.1	681.5	-2.4
86	677.0	683.4	-6.4

	Grade vs	Spaces (Jan 81)	(Operating)
E1-E4	342,851	329,183	96%
E5-E9	210,033	252,703	83%
O1-O3	34,319	33,745	98%
O4-O6	21,896	25,716	85%

	Faces vs	Spaces	(21% of MOS are infeasible)
17B E3	169	9	
9A E4	180	308	
Radar E3	90	117	
Cr Mbr E6	68	136	
E7	32	31	

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FORCE STRUCTURE/MANPOWER MANAGEMENT

A. AGENCIES


- |             |          |          |             |
|-------------|----------|----------|-------------|
| o EXECUTIVE | o DCSOPS | o COA    | MACOMS (16) |
| o SEC DEP   | o DCSPER | o DCSRDA |             |
| o SEC ARMY  | o DCSLOG | o CNGB   |             |
| o CSA       | o ACSI   | o CAR    |             |

B. MIS (23) <sup>1/</sup>

- o OMNIBUS - (Not Acronym) - Uses readiness indicator model to annually assess personnel & equipment casualty/loss and project replenishment.
  - o TLRs - Total Logistics Readiness System - Part of Total Army Analysis.
  - o TAA - Total Army Analysis- Annual assessment of Force leading to major recruiting.
  - o FAS - Force Accounting System (DCSOPS) - Defines Force at unit level 7 years.
  - o TAADS - The Army Auth Document System (DCSOPS) - VTAADS, ITAADS.
  - o SACS - Structure and Composition System (DCSOPS) - Combines FAS and TAADS and BOIP and TOE.
    - PERSACS - Personnel Structure and Composition System - Drives DCSPER Actions - Project faces vs Auth.
    - LOGSACS - Logistics Structure and Composition System - Drives DCSLOG Actions - Project equip vs Auth.
  - o CBS - Civilian Budget System Operated by COA - Records and tracks civilian dollars - also allocates.
  - o AFP - Army Force Program (DCSPER) - Records manpower space transactions.
  - o FORDIMS - Force Development Integrated Mgt System (DCSOPS) - Interface FAS, TAADS, AFP/CBJ (Not Fully Operational)
  - o TOE - Tables of Org and Equip - Operated by TRADOC; used by HQDA; updated sx annually by Consolidate Change.
- <sup>2/</sup>
- o BOIP - Basis of Issue Plan - Describes all equip under development, who gets what and trade-offs.
  - o ELIM-COMPLIP - Enlisted Loss Inventory Model - Computation of Manpower Linear Programming - Projects aggregate personnel needs of Army.
  - o PAAS - Personnel Auth Anal Sys - Analyzes PERSACS data for DCSPER & MILPERCEN.
  - o FPIS - Force Planning Info Sys - Costs equipment mixes; equip airtransportability.
  - o BOIMARS - Basis of Issue Recording & Monitoring System - Equip auth anal sys - Analyzes LOGSACS data.

- <sup>1/</sup> 23 other systems identified at MACOM level - some correlate with DA systems, some are unique.  
<sup>2/</sup> Not tied to TAADS and PERSACS - being worked on - needed.

**TAADS DEVELOPMENT:**



## THROW AWAYS

### FORCE STRUCTURE

1. So call "CAPTAIN SHORTAGE" only 1089 by end FY 81
2. AUTHORIZATIONS ALONE (NOT INCLUDING TTMS) FOR MAJORS AND LTCs ARE GREATER THAN THE DOPMA LIMITS FOR FY 82.
  - MAJ - AUTH 15664      DOPMA - 14565
  - LTC - AUTH 10174      DOPMA - 9592(Adding in the NECESSARY TTMS MAKES PROBLEM EVEN WORSE)
3. 4227 DOCUMENTS DEFINE THE ACTIVE ARMY FORCE (7418 UNITS - MTOE & TDA)
4. 1.67 million SEPARATE TAPPS TRANSACTIONS IN 3 MONTHS (5 JAN - 5 APR 80)

# ACQUIRE

## FUNCTIONS

- OFFICER ACCESSION
- ENLISTED ACCESSIONS
- REENLISTMENT

## CHARACTERISTICS

- VOLUNTEER ARMY/NO DRAFT LEGISLATED RECRUITING PARAMETERS
- MIS DO NOT ACCURATELY DEFINE ACCESSION REQUIREMENTS
  - DISPARATE DATA BASES AND OUT OF SYNC
- SHRINKING MARKET, INCREASED COMPETITION, REDUCED ARMY ATTRACTIVENESS
- RECRUITING/REENLISTMENT OPTIONS LIMIT FLEXIBILITY IN ASSIGNMENTS
- RECRUITING IS SEASONAL - ACTIVE & RESERVE COMPONENTS
- 44% OF FORCE IS ACQUIRED IN 33% OF THE YEAR

## AGENCIES (24)

- HODA & MACOMS
- DCSPER DRIVES
- USAREC, ETC. INVOLVED

## MGHT INFO SYSTEMS (15)

- PERSACS
- ELIMCOMPLIP
- PIA
- ATRRS (ARPRINT)
- REQUEST
- RETAIN

## OBSERVATIONS

- RECRUITING YESTERDAY'S ARMY
- 14-18 MONTHS BETWEEN REQ. DEFINITION AND ASSIGNMENT
- RECRUIT/REUP OPTIONS WERE DEVELOPED TO MEET AGGREGATE NUMBERS BUT LIMIT FLEXIBILITY IN DISTRIBUTION

# TRAIN

## FUNCTIONS

- INITIAL ENTRY TNG
- FUNCTIONAL (NON-RELATED TO MOS)

## AGENCIES (13)

- HQDA & MACOMS
- DCSOPS DRIVES
- TRADOC/OTHER SCHOOL SYSTEMS
- FORSCOM, AS NEEDED

## MGMT INFO SYSTEMS (13)

- PERSACS
- ELIMCOMPLIP
- PIA
- APPATS
- TRG
- ATTRS (ARPRINT)
- REQUEST
- TREDS
- RESTAS

## CHARACTERISTICS

ACCESSION DRIVEN  
INDIVIDUALLY ORIENTED  
- 1100 TRADOC COURSES  
RESOURCE CONSTRAINED  
FLUCTUATING TNG REQUIREMENTS  
MIS ARE SEQUENTIAL AND NOT  
LINKED TO COMMON DATA BASE  
SEASONAL TNG SURGES  
- FY 80 TRADOC TRAINED 224k  
BT & OSUT, 44.1%  
TRAINED JUN-SEPT

## OBSERVATIONS

TRAINS YESTERDAY'S ARMY

TNG BASE IS "VALVE" THAT  
REGULATES RATE OF FLOW  
THROUGH PERSONNEL  
"PROCESS"

TNG BASE REACTS TO CHANGING  
REQUIREMENTS AND CREATES  
DISTRIBUTION TURBULENCE

TRAINING (continued)

D. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

- Interface between ATRRS and REQUEST scheduled for 3d quarter, 1981.
- TMS (Trainee Management System) proposed central data base to support all facets of enlisted accession management. Will interface with other accession and training systems.

E. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS:

1. PERSACS (Personnel Structure and Composition System) produces current and projected authorizations by MOS and grade.
2. ELIM-COMPLIP (Computation of Manpower Programs using Linear Programming) gains and losses to determine accession required to generate an optimal manpower program.
3. PIA II (Personnel Inventory Analysis) computes enlisted MOS training requirements constrained by ELIM-COMPLIP.
4. APPATS (Automated Program to Project AIT Training Space) computes ARNG enlisted MOS training requirements.
5. TRG (Training Requirements Generator) computes USAR enlisted MOS training requirements.
6. ATRRS (Army Training Requirements and Resources System) produces ARPRINT and provides information about each Army course of instruction.
7. REQUEST (Recruit Quota System) manages flow of IET accessions into the training base by space reservation system.
8. RETAIN (Reenlistment Assignment System) reenlistment and assignment system.
9. TREDs (TRADOC Educational Data System) monitors student progress in TRADOC schools and grades and posts examination results.
10. RESTAS (Reception Station System) provides reception stations with cards and listing to process accessions.
11. ACT (Automated Control of Trainees) monitors the records of each enlisted person in the training base.
12. IRPS (Initial Recretee Processing System) individual recretee tracking through reception station.
13. MUMS (Manpower Utilization Management System) manages current TRADOC FY and next two years civilian and military manpower data.

## TRAINING

### A. AGENCIES:

- HQDA (DCSOPS/DCSPER)
- MILPERCEN
- TRADOC
- DOD SCHOOLS
- DARCOM
- FORSCOM
- ACADEMY OF HEALTH SCIENCES
- USAREUR
- AIR TRAINING COMMAND
- NAVAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING
- JAG
- NGB
- USAR

### B. CHARACTERISTICS:

1. Accession driven.
2. Individually oriented
  - 1100 TRADOC courses training 400,000 individuals annually
  - 170 DARCOM courses training 27,000 individuals annually
3. Resource constrained
  - Intelligence School, Devens could not schedule 812 IET seats for FY 81 due to instructor constraints in 3 courses (33S, 98J, 05G).
4. Fluctuating training requirements.
  - Letter from CG, Armor School to General Starry, 21 Jan 1980 "...The instability of the ARPRINT remains a major problem. The fluctuation between ARPRINT forecasts inhibits long range planning, often invalidates prior planning and wastes resources..."
  - Commanders statement, TRADOC, FY 82-86 Program Analysis and Resources Review, 17 January 1980, "...Realizing that ARPRINT projections may very well not materialize as anticipated (as experience indicates) TRADOC is still required to plan and schedule to accommodate ARPRINT tasking...we need more realistic outyear guidance in order to develop a meaningful program submission."
5. MIS are sequential and not linked to common data base.
6. Seasonal training surges
  - In FY 80 TRADOC trained 224,000 soldiers in BT and OSUT--44.1% of those soldiers entered training in the June-Sep (surge period) timeframe.
  - FY 81 projects that TRADOC will train 45% - 50% of initial entry accessions in surge period.

### C. OBSERVATIONS:

1. Trains yesterday's Army
2. Training base is valve that regulates rate of flow through personnel process.
  - Reception station facility capability is 285,000 receptees annually.
  - Reception station staffing capability varies based on current authorizations and is lower than facility constraint.
3. Training base reacts to changing requirements and creates distribution turbulence.
  - ARPRINT changes for 67N10 course for FY 81 from May 1979 (resourced position) went from 1689 requirements to 1459 (Oct 1979) - 1888 (April 1980) - 2155 (October 1980) - April 1981 ARPRINT will forecast final requirement.

## DISTRIBUTE

### A. AGENCIES (26)

EXECUTIVE BRANCH - macro policy	DCSPER - micro policy	MACOMS (16) - operators
CONGRESS - policy	MILPERCEN - operator	USAREC - impacts 1st termers
OSD - priorities	PROF BRANCHES - operator	INDIVIDUAL - recruit/re-up options
DCSOPS - priorities	RCPAC - operator	RGB - policy/operator

### B. CHARACTERISTICS

1. Faces not equal to spaces (grade and MOS)
  - E6 auth - 76,456, OP STR - 73,019
  - E8 auth - 14,733, OP STR - 12,538
  - O4 auth - 13,466, ODP - 10,347 (OPMD)
  - O5 auth - 9,000, ODP - 7,815 (OPMD)
2. Distribute shortages by priorities (conflicting)
  - DAMPL used to set initial priorities for distribution, later directed fill guidance conflicts/skews priorities
  - 48,000 EM in special management activities.
3. Geographical Stationing Aggravates Distribution.
  - 40 percent of authorizations OCONUS - 42% of soldiers stationed OCONUS.
  - 257,000 soldiers move to and from overseas annually.
  - 550,000 soldiers move worldwide annually.
4. Individually oriented policies create less than optimum distribution.
  - 95-97 percent of combat arms AIT grads are precommitted.
  - 37 percent (100,000) soldiers in CONUS are stabilized--not available for overseas assignment.
  - 6800 soldiers are home-based annually to installations where requirements may change.
  - More than 60,000 soldiers are married to other soldiers--the increasing number will cause even more joint domicile assignments.
  - All personnel policies.
5. Distribution decisions based on disparate data bases.
  - Commanders requisition using their current approved ITAADS documents --MILPERCEN validates requisitions using PERSACS. The two do not match.
6. System is "pull" oriented. (Requisition driver)
  - About 300,000 new requisitions enter the system annually.
  - MILPERCEN assigns only to installation level in CONUS; to MACOMS overseas.
7. Training output drives distribution flow.
  - We recruit 44 percent of the force during 1/3 of the year.
  - During peak output periods soldiers are sometimes distributed over authorizations, based on best estimates of future needs.
  - "6" During period of low output, support of overseas requirements causes FORSCOM to draw down strength levels.

### D. OBSERVATIONS: (Stand alone)

# THROW AWAYS

## DISTRIBUTION

1. 6800 Soldiers homebased annually to posts where REQUIREMENTS may change

37% (100,000) Soldiers in CONUS are stabilized  
- NOT AVAILABLE FOR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

95-97% of Combat Arms AIT Graduates are precommitted by enlistment options.

4. More than 60,000 soldiers are married to other soldiers - the increasing number will cause even more joint domicile.

5. 1 out of every 3 soldiers put on orders is either deferred or deleted (policies + faulty data buses)

17C from

# DISTRIBUTE

**FUNCTIONS**  
- PROVIDE FACES FOR SPACES BY GRADE/SKILL

**CHARACTERISTICS**  
FACES NOT EQUAL TO SPACES BY NUMBERS-GRADE/SKILL  
DISTRIBUTES SHORTAGES BY PRIORITIES (CONFLICTING)  
GEOGRAPHICAL STATIONING  
- AGGREGATES 40% OCONUS  
INDIVIDUALLY ORIENTED POLICIES  
CREATE LESS THAN OPTIMUM DISTRIBUTION  
- 32 ENL/REEL OPTIONS  
- 10,000 DELETIONS/DEFERMENTS FROM ORDERS PER MONTH  
DISTRIBUTION DECISION BASED ON DISPARATE DATA BASES  
- TAADS VS PERSACS  
- SYSTEM PULL ORIENTED  
- 300,000 (ANNUAL) RONS  
TNG OUTPUT DRIVES DISTRIBUTION PROCESS FLOW


**AGENCIES (27)**  
EXTERNAL AGENCIES  
HDDA  
MACOM (16)  
DCSPER DRIVEN  
- IMPACT TOTAL ARMY

**MGMT INFO SYSTEMS (19)**  
- PPM (DAMPL)  
- TAADS  
- PERSACS  
- OPUS/NOMOD  
- CAP III  
- MOBPERS

**OBSERVATIONS**  
DISTRIBUTES YESTERDAY'S ARMY AGAINST TODAY'S AUTHORIZATIONS  
PROCESS ATTEMPTS TO REACT TO CHANGING PRIORITIES BUT INDIVIDUALLY ORIENTED POLICIES COMPLICATE

Chart / Chart

# A MOVING TARGET



# DEPLOY

**FUNCTIONS**  
READYING UNITS FOR  
OVERSEAS MISSIONS

**EXTERNAL AGENCIES  
DCSOPS DRIVEN**

- OCAR
- NGB

3)

- IPDU
- PPM (DAMPL)
- OPUS/NOMOD
- CAP 111
- OMF/EMF
- SIDPERS

**CHARACTERISTICS**

UNITS CONSIST OF INDIVIDUALS  
WITH DIFFERENT DEPLOYABILITY  
CRITERIA (POLICY)

- STABILIZATION; ETS; SOLE PARENT;  
PREGNANCY
- REQUIRES INTENSIVE "OFF LINE" MGMT
- MANUAL ASSIST TO AUTOMATED SYSTEM

**OBSERVATIONS**

REASSIGNMENT OF SOLDIERS TO/FROM  
DEPLOYING UNITS TO MEET INDIVIDUAL  
DEPLOYABILITY CRITERIA CAUSES  
TURBULENCE

BDE 76 - REASSIGNED 3081 EM FT CARSON/  
4TH ID TO DEPLOY 2/42 EM IN BDE

+ TGT For  
Tank Force,

DEPLOY

AGENCIES (12):

EXECUTIVE BRANCH  
OSD - policy  
DCSOPS - policy  
DCSPER - policy

policy

MILPERCEN - operator  
CAR - operator  
CNGB - operator  
MTHC - opera

RCPAC - operator  
USAF - operator  
FORSCOM - executor  
TRADOC - executor

by policy

employabil:

CHARACTERISTICS:

1. Units consist

Requires intensive  
Manual ass:

individuals w/  
management  
automa systems

nd (vi) depl

bd:

OBSERVATIONS

1. Reassignment  
turbulenc  
Bde 76

leploy:

ID

Pt Carson

roop loymen  
deployment and

:ep)

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

NA

MIS (MGT INFO SYSTEM) (8  
TPFDL - (Time Phased Forc Deployment .is)  
JOBS - (Joint Opers systems  
BIDPERS  
FPH (DAMPL)  
OPUS/NOMOD  
CAP III  
OMF/EME  
WOBPERS

Time lating to  
if capabi

:og)

# SUSTAIN

FUNCTION  
- KEEP GOING

AGENCIES  
- SA  
- CSA  
- CMDS  
- INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER

MGMT INFO SYSTEMS (135)  
- ACTIVE 110  
- USA8 22  
- NG 3

CHARACTERISTICS  
ARMY IS TURBULENT  
- 561.8K PCS MOVES IN 1980  
- MIS ARE EVOLUTIONARY  
- NO SINGLE INTEGRATED MIS SYSTEM  
REUP POLICIES ALLOW LOCATION/SKILL SHIFTS  
RECLASSIFICATION POLICIES NOT ORIENTED TO ARMY NEEDS  
HI-TECH SKILLED SOLDIERS HARD TO RETAIN (CIVILIAN MARKET)  
SUSTAINMENT POLICIES ARE REACTIVE (BONUS FOR MOS)

OBSERVATIONS  
SUSTAINMENT POLICIES DO NOT SUPPORT FORCE STRUCTURE  
- 70 INFEASIBLE MOS STRUCTURES  
SUSTAINMENT POLICIES CONTRIBUTE TO TURBULENCE  
- 5000 CONUS TO CONUS REENLISTMENTS  
MODERNIZATION WILL REQUIRE ENHANCED RETENTION PROGRAMS  
- 15,000 MORE MECHANICS BY 1987

1.

SUSTAIN

OTHER

Modernization will have a tremendous impact on the MOS inventory--new, sophisticated equipment will require either soldier retraining, new MOSs or ASIs. The need will exceed existing capability. Philosophical changes must occur which facilitate lateral entry programs. Why don't we obtain our mechanics from the floundering automobile industry? Expanded lateral entry programs require dollars and programs which will enable immediate reaction to modernization requirements. Present retention trends are strong; we should tighten up Reclassification/Reenlistment criteria to ensure that the soldier supports the Army's need. As we discipline the document system, the requirements will become more current and meaningful. Due to skill requirement differences--not all overages can become the "fix" for shortages; however, when CMP 98 is at 74% and CMP 84 is at 123% (Dec 80 data) some "fixing" should be possible.

Consideration should be given to specific solutions to skill shortages. The Army must consider further delineation between leaders and technicians. One approach would be to cap technicians at mid-level grades; incorporating a step increase concept to enable the technician to keep pace with his leader counterpart who was promoted to higher grades.

# THROW AWAY

## SUSTAIN & PERSONNEL PROCESS

MORE THAN 900,000 SOLDIERS PCS ANNUALLY

250,000 ACCESSIONS/LOSSES ANNUALLY

### 3. PERSONNEL

MGMT INFO

3 -

4. Computer supported systems at MACOM LEVEL
- 69 - as reported by MACOMs
  - 116 - FROM DA Pam 18-1-1
  - 34 - correlated between two sets ABOVE  
by War College Study Group

# DEVELOP

## FUNCTION

- INDIVIDUAL PROF. DEV.
- COLLECTIVE/UNIT DEV.

## CHARACTERISTICS

TNG SEATS UNFILLED  
- FY 80 WORLDWIDE NCOES  
TNG RQMT - 65,837  
ACTUAL INPUT 51,957  
INDIVIDUAL TNG REQUIREMENTS  
FOR PROF. DEV. ARE NOT  
WELL DEFINED  
TURBULENCE/PERSONNEL SHORTAGES  
CONSTRAIN COLLECTIVE UNITS  
TNG  
WORLDWIDE OPN'L COMMITMENTS,  
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, PRECLUDE  
PROFESSIONAL DEV. OF ALL  
SOLDIERS

## AGENCIES (12)

- DCSOPS
- DCSPER
- MILPERCEN
- RCPAC
- TRADOC
- FORSCOM
- NGB
- OCLAB

## MGMT INFO SYSTEMS (8)

- RETAIN
- ATRS (ARPRINT)
- PERSACS
- OMF/EMF
- SIDPERS
- CAP III
- OPUS/NOMOD

## OBSERVATIONS

CURRENT DEVELOPMENT MODE EVOLVED  
TO FUNCTION IN AN INDIVIDUAL  
REPLACEMENT PROCESS  
MOVE TO UNIT REPLACEMENT SYSTEM  
WOULD REQUIRE THIS FUNCTION TO  
BE REDESIGNED

# SEPARATE

## FUNCTION

- LOSS TO ACTIVE & R.C.

## CHARACTERISTICS

- SEPARATION AUTHORITY IS DECENTRALIZED AND IMMEDIATE; ACCESSIONS ARE CENTRALIZED AND LENGTHY
- RETIRE 60 DAYS - ACCESS 16 MONTHS
- SEPARATION POLICIES SERVE THE INDIVIDUAL
- CURRENT INDIVIDUALLY ORIENTED SEPARATION POLICIES COMPLICATE DISTRIBUTION & CAUSE TURBULENCE
- E6 ETS LOSSES - 4000 1980
  - E5 - E7 ETS IN LIEU OF PCS 3357-(CY)

## AGENCIES (7+)


- EXTERNAL AGENCIES
- HQDA
- MACOMS (GCM AUTH)
- DCSPER DRIVEN
- MILPERCEN
  - NGB
  - OCAR

## MGMT INFO SYSTEMS (6)


- EMF/OMF
- ELIMCOMPLIP
- SIDPERS
- MOBPERS
- PIA II
- JUMPS

## OBSERVATIONS

SEPARATION POLICIES ALLOW UNPROGRAMMED LOSSES (GRADE/SKILL) AND CONTRIBUTE TO TURBULENCE



MANNING SYSTEM APPROACH





MANNING SYSTEM HAS OBJECTIVES, ENVIRONMENT, RESOURCES,  
COMPONENTS AND MANAGEMENT.

## System Elements:

A SYSTEM HAS:


- OBJECTIVES
- ENVIRONMENT
- RESOURCES
- COMPONENTS
- MANAGEMENT

# MANNING MODEL




## NEW SYSTEM SHOULD


- INCREASE STABILITY IN UNITS
- PROVIDE ARMY GRADE/SKILL NEEDS
- BE RESPONSIVE TO EXTERNAL CHANGE
- PROVIDE STANDARDS/CONTROL FOR EVALUATION OF SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
- BE CAPABLE OF REPLACING UNITS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS
- BE CAPABLE OF ROTATING UNITS
- BE FLEXIBLE TO MEET PEACE/WARTIME DEMANDS
- PROVIDE CENTRAL DIRECTION OF ALL MANNING FUNCTIONS & DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION
- PROGRAM CHANGES, FORECAST RQMTS (GRADE/SKILL), PROVIDE REAL-TIME ACCOUNTING AND MGMT REVIEWS
- PROVIDE CONSISTENT DISTRIBUTION POLICIES
- BE RESPONSIVE TO NEEDS OF USER



# NEW SYSTEM



*Grant*  
**MANNING SYSTEM**



**PREREQUISITES**

**WHAT**

1. **DISCIPLINE THE SYSTEM**

**WHY**

REDUCE TURBULENCE  
REMOVE PERMISSIVENESS  
IN DOCUMENTATION  
SYSTEM

**HOW -**

- DCSMANNING
- CENTRAL CONTROL OF DOCUMENTATION
- STANDARDIZE AUTHORIZATION DOCUMENTS
- LIMIT STRUCTURE CHANGES TO OUTYEARS
- MGMT REVIEWS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE
- DISCIPLINE DOCUMENT SYSTEM AND ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL STRENGTH, IF REQUIRED
- ELIMINATE EXCEPTED UNITS AND BALANCE FORCE BY SKILL AND GRADE

2. **GET FACES EQUAL TO SPACES IN GRADE/SKILL**

STOP "HAVES" AND "HAVE NOTS"

*Concept*

# MANNING SYSTEM

CON'T.

3. ENSURE PERSONNEL POLICIES DO NOT DETRACT FROM READINESS

SYSTEM APPROACH TO CHANGES

ENSURE ANY POSSIBLE IMPACT ON ANY FUNCTIONS IN SYSTEM IS EVALUATED/ COSTED

- GRC STUDY & DETAILED FOLLOW UP PROGRAM TO INITIATE CHANGES WHERE NECESSARY (LEGISLATION, POLICIES, REGS, PROCEDURES-DA/OSD)

4. DESIGN AN ADAPTIVE, INTEGRATED INFO. MGMT. SYSTEM CAPABLE OF PLANNING & EXECUTING TIMELY MANNING SYSTEM DECISIONS

CONTROL THE DYNAMICS OF FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES TO REDUCE TURBULENCE


- CONSOLIDATE PRESENT FRACTIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE MPR SUBSYSTEMS

DEVELOP FUNCTIONAL FORCE-STRUCTURE TARGETS UPON WHICH TO BASE INFO MGMT. SYSTEMS

DESIGN A PLANNING INFO SYSTEM THAT CAN INTEGRATE INFO FROM DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONAL LEVELS AND CROSS FUNCTIONAL LINES IN EXECUTION

DEVELOP MANABLE FORCE STRUCTURES

- DEVELOP COMMON USAGE DATA BASES WHICH PROVIDE A FREE MARKETPLACE FOR INFO



THE RELEVANT MASS

- Shred the Army to the Relevant Mass for Unit Replacement

We consider only Armor, Mechanized Infantry and Infantry companies.

The Shredding Process:

- Total Army: TOE 76%

TDA 24%

CONUS ARMY: TOE 67%

TDA 33%

OCONUS ARMY: TOE 89%

TDA 11%

- ~~Armor MOS's in 163 Armor Companies:~~

CONUS 1.5% of Total Force

OCONUS 2.3% of Total Force

TOTAL 2.0% of Total Force

- ~~Infantry Mos's in 321 Infantry Companies:~~

CONUS 6.8% of Total Force

OCONUS 7.2% of Total Force

TOTAL 7.0% of Total Force

We addressed 9% of the Total Force in our analysis -

# THE QUESTION...

WHICH IS THE BEST REPLACEMENT  
SYSTEM FOR THE ARMY?

- INDIVIDUAL?
- UNIT?
- COMBINATION?



# KEY ISSUES...

- WHICH LEVEL?
- HOW DO WE FORM?
- HOW DO WE KEEP TOGETHER?
- HOW MUCH OF THE ARMY DO WE INVOLVE?
- CAN WE AFFORD IT?

o THE SYSTEM MUST.....

- o Be Manageable
- o Meet the needs of The Army
- o Work during mob
- o Not forget the soldier

o WE BELIEVE.....

... That it would be best

for the Army to have a combination

system      part individual

part unit

# HOW TO DECIDE ?

- MANNING THE FORCE
- TRAINING THE FORCE
- MODERNIZING THE FORCE
- DEPLOYING THE FORCE
- SUSTAINING THE FORCE

ARMY  
MODERN

# SOME HISTORY

PACKAGE  
UNIT ROTATION  
(1944-1945)

UNIT  
ROTATION  
(1917-1918)

PLATOON  
EXPERIMENT  
(1953-1955)

LONG THRUST  
(1962-1963)

UN ROTATION  
PLAN (1974/  
BDE 75-76)

DEPOT BN (1899-  
1912) CUBA, PUERTO  
RICO, PHILIPPINES 19C.

GYROSCOPE  
(1955-1959)

OVU REP  
(1961-1962)

ROTA  
PLAN (1962-  
1963)

REFORMER  
(1969)

HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE


<u>ACTION</u>	<u>PURPOSE(S)</u>	<u>WHY TERMINATED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
o Depot Bn (1899-1912) Cuba, Puerto Rico, Phillipines Isc	Rotate ill, ineff. pers. via unit rotation	↑\$, ↓ time o/s, Δ structure due to manpower shortage	Totally sat. Only period in USA when unit repl. was <u>policy</u>
o Unit rotation (1917-1918)	Sustain ex. force, pre-train units for combat with 1 CONUS div supporting 2 OCONUS divisions	H1 attrition, tng time crippled CONUS Div, started stripping CONUS Div	CONUS could not sustain plan
o Package Unit rotation (1944-1945)	Carrier Unit Repl sys to get sqds, plts to Europe ready for combat	Local cdr forced to break units due to combat req., ↑\$ manpower, FS Δ 's	Reserved because of monetary and manpower demand
o Platoon experiment (1953-1955)	Follow-on to WW exp. plt. level considered more practical to train, process and move OCONUS	Reassignment and morale problems with older, seasoned troops, ↓ efficiency, ↓ flex.	Mechanically worked well, "system" can handle but rejected for flexibility
o Gyroscope (1955-1959)	↑ Morale, ↑ combat eff. ↓ spt & facility costs	Expected results not realized, ↑\$ flow combat eff. fluctuated too much at 3 phase (initial, mid-tour, tour end)	Most ambitious unit plan ever tried by USA, <u>morale</u> ↑ (T), 3 phase Δ in effectiveness documented
o OVU rep (1961-1962)	Spt Korea, ↓ turbulence, ↓ trans cost, ↑ morale & esprit	Berlin crisis (1962) (could not handle contingencies)	7 BG deployed, <u>all expectations met</u> , unique situation: No draft, 12 Mo tour, "combat zone"
o Long Thrust (1962-1963)	Test of strategic mobility (3 bdes) to Europe	↑ costs, ↓ readiness of units	Completed 7 exercises, no dep, 3 mo TDY

Historical History (cont'd)

<u>ACTION</u>	<u>PURPOSE(S)</u>	<u>WHY TERMINATED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
o ROTA plan (1962-1963)	↓ gold flow, ↓ B-P deficits	Personnel turbulence, ↓ readiness, did not ↓ B-P deficits (actually ↑), ↑ costs	Congress directed, no dep, 6 mo TDY, 3 BC per rotation (2Y) 1-Berlin, 1-tng, 1-CONUS
o REFORGER (1969)	Mil - deployment exercise (AF&AR), draw POMCUS	Too many Δ to plans save \$2.2M gold flow, ↓ morale ↓ Europe readiness	Only involved 1 Bde, 24th D -- perm depl in Europe, exercise w/NATO forces
o UN rotation plan (1974) / Bde 75-76/	Exercise AF-AR joint mobility & POMCUS; show spt for NATO, tie US div. to Europe	↑ \$, ↓ total Europe readiness, MACOM pressure	FORSCOM, Europe, CSA against IT, Appr by SECDEF AFTER CSA DEATH (1974)

3A B fac-1

HISTORICAL



## A SOLDIER SPEAKS...

... HOWEVER MUCH WE MAY HONOR THE "UNKNOWN SOLDIER"  
AS THE SYMBOL OF SACRIFICE IN WAR, LET US NOT MISTAKE  
THE FACT THAT IT IS THE "KNOWN SOLDIER" WHO WINS  
BATTLES. SENTIMENT ASIDE, IT IS THE MAN WHOSE IDENTITY  
IS WELL KNOWN TO HIS FELLOW SOLDIERS WHO HAS THE MAIN  
CHANCE AS A BATTLE EFFECTIVE.

S.L.A. MARSHALL


"MEN AGAINST FIRE"

1947

# UNIT REPLACEMENT

## ADVANTAGES

- ENHANCES COHESION AND STABILITY
- REINFORCES STANDARDIZATION PROGRAM
- REDUCES NEED TO REPEAT TRAINING
- ENHANCES NCO DEVELOPMENT
- HELPS COMMANDERS PLAN
- MAINTAINS TRAINING PROFICIENCY
- ENHANCES MSN ORIENTED TRAINING
- REMOVES INCENTIVE TO "PEAK" UNITS
- REDUCES CHANGE
- FACILITATES TRANSITION TO MOBILIZATION
- REDUCES REQUIREMENT TO "TOP OFF"
- PROVIDES FOR MORE VALID EVALUATIONS
- FACILITATES POR REQUIREMENTS



# UNIT REPLACEMENT

## DISADVANTAGES

- EFFECTS OF CHANGE ARE UNKNOWN
- TRANSITION PERIOD MAY BE TRAUMATIC
- RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
- EFFECT ON PLANS
- EFFECT ON READINESS
- EFFECT ON UNITS/INDIVIDUALS NOT INVOLVED
- RESOURCES REQUIRED

WE LOOKED AT...

••• THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF REPLACING  
AND ROTATING:

- TEAMS/SQDS/SECTIONS/PLTS
- COMPANIES
- BATTALIONS
- BRIGADES

AND CONCLUDED THAT •••

AMUS  
MOSKY

A CLOSE CALL...

••• IT'S A CLOSE CALL BETWEEN  
THE COMPANY AND THE BATTALION BUT  
WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE COMPANIES  
BECAUSE •••

ARMY  
MOTHER

## COMPANY BECAUSE ...

- IMPACT ON FACILITIES/COMMUNITIES/SUPPORT ACTIVITIES
- ADVANTAGE OF MAINTAINING EXPERIENCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY *at the level*
- COSTS
- FLEXIBILITY
- NEED TO LEARN WHAT WE'RE DOING
- DIFFICULTY OF MANAGING LARGE NUMBERS OF MOS/SKILL LEVELS/RANKS

25 MAR

UNIT	TOTAL STRENGTH ENL+OFF=	CAREERS (SKILL LEVEL 2+)	FIRST SERVED (SKILL 1)	TOTAL DIFF MDS	TOTAL DIFF SKILL-LEVELS	1-YEAR SKILL LEVEL	MARRIED EM / OFF = TOT	ACCOMMODATED OPONS EM / OFF = TOT
LINE	85 + 5 = 90	41	44	9	20 / 6	44 / 6	44 / =	34 /
LINE	85 + 5 = 90	41	44	9	20 / 6	44 / 6	44 / =	34 /
LINE	85 + 5 = 90	41	44	9	20 / 6	44 / 6	44 / =	34 /
SPT	88 + 5 = 93	36	52	11	26 / 8	44 / 8	44 / =	34 /
HHC	168 + 18 = 186	61	107	28	58 / 21	78 / 21	78 / =	60 /
	51 + 38 = 89 <u>549</u>	220	291	33	78 / 26	254 / 26	254 / =	196 /

DATA ON OFFICERS NOT  
AVAILABLE AT TIME  
OF REPORTING  
SOURCE: ARMY JOURNAL

25 MAR

UNIT	TOTAL STRENGTH ENL+OFF=	CAREERS (SKILL LEVEL 2+)	FIRST TERM (SKILL 1)	TOTAL DIFF MDS	TOTAL DIFF SKILL LEVELS	1 YEAR SKILL LEVEL	MARRIED EM / OFF = TOT	ACCOMMODATED OSOONS
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SP	88 + 5 = 93	36	52	11	26 / 8	44 / =	34 /	
MHC	168 + 18 = 186	61	107	28	58 / 21	78 / =	60 /	
	511 + 38 = 549	220	291	33	78 / 26	254 / =	196 / =	

11

DATA ON OFFICERS NOT AVAILABLE AT TIME OF X-RAYING  
SOURCE: ARMY JOURNAL

4A Form

MOS and Skill Level Jump

● To form a Tank Company

- Requires 9 different MOS spread over 20 skill levels.
- Requires individual assignment of 41 individuals (skill level 2 and above).

● To form a Tank Battalion

- Requires 33 different MOS spread over 78 skill levels.
- Requires individual assignment of 220 individuals (skill level 2 and above).

Source: TOE 17-036H Series

Impact on Families and OCONUS Facilities

- There will be 44 married soldiers (does not include officers) in the Tank Company. 34 of the families will accompany overseas.
- There will be 254 married soldiers (does not include officers) in the Tank Battalion. 196 of the families will accompany overseas.


Source: Army Info Book


See chart on back of next page.

NOTE: Can also give numbers for Mech, Inf and FA with one hour notice.

# the MOS jump


MANPOWER MGMT.






BEFORE WE DO IT

MTOES    curren    bein    andard; ed    happen    'ep;    wi    spec  
**Priori .es**    be equa    CONUS su:    in    nd    ep; oyed    wi  
  personne) and equipment





$$C_E = f(L_s, C_u, \dots)$$

$C_E$  = Combat  
 $L_s$  = Leaders  
 $C_u$  = Cohesion

.....  $L_q$   
 Training & ...  
 Stress- ...  
 Q = quality ...  
 C<sub>q</sub> = ...

ASUM T N N COMPUT N C S- DATA

20 company

92 INF  
5. ARM  
86 FA

} M IN P R 2 RE TH  
2/3 THE TOTAL NUM A

- A UNIT THAT M N VT PER ONE FROM CPU TAA N  
UNITS T MA ROM FOR TRAIN AN FROM U UNITS  
TO MAKE ROM FOR REP COMPAN , 80% CON ID BE  
REAS ON P 5 AND 20% W 8 U = M N T N W F
- A UNIT THAT AFT 2 8 M NTH 0 MVS WITH A COMPANY  
40% of MAILED CODE (A ME % MAILED) W 0 MA  
T M = T AN THEE NTA 71 N FOR REMA NO R OF 3 MON  
TIME
- M DEL H W 0 57 5 ADDITINA ONE EAS PLS W N L BE  
REQ 2 0 T. PP AT N W SYSTEM CAUSED RE MAR T  
BT M REEN N UNAC OMAN 0 0 MVS T NR FROM  
24 T 18 MO TMS

• ASSUME (AS DID CEEP) THAT 300  
TO SEND CD 56 TO UST THE  
NO BE A AT 0  
RECEIVED N I ET

AMUS  
MAY

BEFORE WE DO IT...

WE MUST

- STANDARDIZE MTOES
- CHANGE PRIORITIES

# COST

CALCULATIONS BASED ON 230 CO/BTRY  
REPLACEMENTS PER YEAR


- o RELOCATE 4600 PERS. IN CONUS TO CREATE SPACES  
FOR TRAINING UNITS (FIRST 3 YRS ONLY)
- o RELOCATE 2760 PERS IN OCONUS TO FIND JOBS FOR  
ACCOMPANIED CADRE AFTER 18 MOS WITH UNIT  
(RECURRING AFTER 3RD YEAR)
- o 5785 ADDITIONAL ROTATIONAL PCS's (RECURRING)
- o TDY FOR CADRE LEADERSHIP TO VISIT RECRUITS  
IN IET (RECURRING)

\$M	MMY (TTHS)
6.2	92
3.8	23
20.0	386
.7	-



# MANNING SYSTEM




THE PERSONNEL MODEL




# MANNING SYSTEM



# MANNING SYSTEM




dc R Form




Eric Rami

**CONCLUSIONS...**


A COMBINATION  
REPLACEMENT  
SYSTEM PROPOSAL



A MANNING  
SYSTEM  
FOR THE  
1990'S



AN AGENCY  
TO DEVELOP  
AND MANAGE  
FUTURE  
MANNING  
ACTIONS



FINALLY

RECOMMENDATIONS

- REPORT BE APPROVED
- DCSPER BE DESIGNATED AS THE DEVELOPER OF THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM  
[Develop, initiate, revise, correct the policies and requirements of a manning system, under a single manager or common operational strategy, that will plan, develop, integrate and operate the manning functions in support of an individual or unit replacement system.]

- DCSPER BE CHARGED TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF STUDY GROUP